This paper considers a situation in which an attacker can select among two possible targets for a single concentrated attack after observing the level of defense at each. Despite the attacker's chance of success being determined by a proportional contest success function, if each target is defended separately the attacker should attack the weakest target creating an all-pay auction arms race between defenders that largely dissipates the value of the defended resources. However, if the defenders form a protective alliance then their expected payoffs increase despite the fact that a successful attack is theoretically more likely given the overall reduction in defense. Controlled laboratory experiments designed to test the model's predictions are also reported. Behaviorally, alliances yield more profit to defenders as predicted, but also reduce the likelihood of a successful attack counter to the theoretical prediction.
Introduction
Imagine the problem faced by a terrorist who has a single bomb and wishes to attack one of multiple possible targets. The targets could be planes owned by different airlines or skyscrapers on different city blocks. The terrorist has the advantage of being able to observe the relative strength of each target's defense and respond accordingly. Intuition suggests that the terrorist would prefer to attack the weaker target thereby increasing the chance of success. Since the more strongly defended target does not get attacked, each defender has an incentive to be slightly better protected than its rival resulting in an all pay auction arms race among the defenders. Of course, such a situation can arise in other settings as well such as a criminal determining which house in a neighborhood to burgle or nation states attempting to expand into neighboring territory. Labor markets where job training or education attainment mimic the bids of an employment contest follow this pattern as well (Fullerton 1999) . This situation also arises in the old joke about two people going hiking in an area inhabited by bears. 1 Rather than providing separate defenses, the defenders could band together and form an alliance. 2 For example, airplane security is done at the airport level rather than the airline level. The United States is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization binding the 1 Two hikers are walking in the woods when one asks the other "What are you going to do if we see a bear?" The second hiker says, "Run." When the first hiker points out that the second hiker can't outrun a bear, the second hiker responds "I don't have to. I just have to outrun you." 2 Our paper treats the alliance as a strategic game played between individuals, similar to other models of alliances as well as models of the provision of public goods. Recently, there has been interest in group decision making where the group reaches a single decision, typically as the result of some group interaction. In this vein, Kocher et al. (2006) demonstrate that decision maker's often prefer group decision making to individual decision making. See Besedes et al. (2102) and references therein for the role that communication within a group and other incentives such as altruism and social loafing impact group performance. One reason that people may prefer group decisions is that it dilutes individual responsibility for bad outcomes. Such a desire could also motivate alliance formation in our strategic setting as well.
military efforts of the US with 27 other sovereign countries. Residential communities often form neighborhood watches. Such alliances are also observed in a variety of business settings from industry lobbying groups and advertising efforts to joint legal counsel in liability lawsuits. In fact alliances are common throughout society and psychologists have argued that people favor the formation of an alliance when facing conflicts due to the competitive disadvantage of the lone individual confronting a group (Baumeister and Leary 1995) .
The normal intuition for an alliance is that the joint defense is greater than each individual defense and thus the alliance is better able to deter or handle an attack. Research by Sheremeta and Zhang (2010) suggests alliances make better decisions than individuals.
Specifically, in lottery contests when team members are able to communicate, groups are found to make more rational decisions than individuals. 3 In this paper we identify (theoretically) and test (using controlled laboratory experiments) another explanation of why alliances form in some situations: forming an alliance can eliminate the costly arms race among defenders resulting in higher expected payoffs despite the fact that the attacker is theoretically more likely to be successful against an alliance.
Our result is driven in part by the fact that the alliance is a public good and encourages free riding as members do not internalize the benefits of their defense investments for the other alliance members. This aspect of alliance behavior was pointed out at least as far back as Olson and Zechhauser (1966) and free riding on public good provision is one of the most robust results from controlled laboratory experiments in economics. Behaviorally, we find that free riding increases with experience, but rarely do all subjects choose to free ride completely (see Ledyard 1995) . That people do not fully free ride has also been documented in alliance experiments. Specifically, Ke et al. (2010) observe group members over bidding in a setting where the group shares a common bid against another party and equally split the proceeds from a successful bid. Recently, Nitzan and Ueda (2008) examine the effect of group size on performance in a collective contest and find that free riding leads larger groups to be less effective at pursuing the collective interest.
While most of the literature on contests has not focused on alliances, there has been some work considering the impact of how the alliance shares the spoils of its success (see Katz and Tokalidu 1996 , Esteban and Sakovics 2003 , Muller and Warneryd 2001 , Warneryd 1998 , and Konrad 2004 . In these models there is typically a single prize to be allocated among successful alliance members. In general these studies find that the internal conflict diminishes the contribution of alliance members. 4 Our model differs from these papers in that each member of the alliance values its own item. This means that there is no distributional conflict within the alliance resulting from a success. Further, the consequences of alliance failure are not borne equally by alliance members. Returning to the example of a terrorist attempting to attack a plane, if the terrorist is unsuccessful both airlines retain their respective planes but if the terrorist is successful one airline incurs the entire loss of its plane while the other incurs no harm. 4 Ke et al. (2010) conduct an experimental analysis of alliances and show that the future internal conflict does not prevent alliance members from fighting shoulder-to-shoulder. On average, allies in a contest against an outside enemy devote the same contest effort irrespective of how they will share the spoils of victory. In addition, the collaboration in alliances is reasonably good, leading to higher success against lone enemies than one might predict.
The paper most closely related to ours is Dighe, et al. (2009) , who also consider a game with two possible targets and one attacker. In their game defense is a binary choice and the outcome is deterministic as an attack is only successful if launched against an undefended target. They compare a decentralized defense where different decision makers defend each target and a centralized defense where a single decision maker makes both defense decisions jointly thereby internalizing the externality associated with defense. In their setup, defense is unobservable (such as the presence of an air marshal on a plane) and they find that centralized decision making is optimal since deterrence can be achieved in some scenarios by protecting only one target.
In our laboratory experiments, defenders are observed to bid less when in an alliance as predicted by the model. There are now several experimental papers on contests (see Sheremeta, et al. 2012 for a thorough survey) and one of the common findings is that people overbid to the point that the equilibrium surplus is often fully depleted (see Davis and Reilly 1998 , and Potters et al. 1998 , Gneezy and Smorodinsky 2006 and Lugovskyy and Puzzello 2008 . 5 Noussair and Silver (2006) addresses the effect of experience, showing that experience helps decrease over-bidding but does not eliminate it. Consistent with both previous contest experiments and previous public goods experiments, alliance behavior is more cooperative (i.e. bids are higher) than predicted. However, contrary to previous contest experiments, we find that defenders under bid when defending separately. Thus, bids do not differ as much as predicted between separate defenses and alliances. The result is that alliances provide greater profitability to defenders (as 5 Lugovskyy and Puzzello 2008 scale the range of bids causing over-bidding to significantly decrease, suggesting that much of over-bidding may be due to psychological bias in the auction mechanism. predicted) and reduce the likelihood of a successful attack (counter to the predictions).
Together these results suggest that defenders should attempt to form alliances when possible.
Theoretical Model
Consider a contest in which single attacker has two possible targets, T 1 and T 2 . The level of defense at each target is determined simultaneously and the attacker can launch a single indivisible attack after observing the level of defense. A successful attack on either target generates a prize, 0, for the attacker, while each target is valued at 0 by its defender. The attack is resolved as a contest with a proportional success function (Tullock 1980 ). We consider two defense arrangements: independent defenses and an alliance.
Case 1: Independent Defense
At the second stage, the attacker observes the defense investment at each target. The attacker's problem is to decide which target to attack and how much to invest. Let 0 and 0 denote the defense investments (bids) at T 1 and T 2 , respectively and let 0 denote the attacker's investment (bid). From attacking target i, the attacker's profit is .
The optimal attack, derived from the first order condition for (1), is * / 0 if else
When it is optimal to attack, substituting (1) into (2) yields * 2 / , which is decreasing in . Therefore, the attacker finds it more profitable to attack the less defended target and is indifferent between the targets if they are equally defended.
At the first stage, the defenders know that the attacker will focus on the weaker target.
The stronger target will earn V with certainty while the weaker target will earn V only if the ultimate attack is unsuccessful. Equation (2) informs the weaker defender of how the attacker will react. Letting denote the level of the weaker defense, the weak defender expects to earn / .
Thus, the defender of target i earns V if , the profit given by (3) with if
, and one of these two amounts selected randomly if , for . Notice that the weak defender's profit, (3), is maximized when . Because the attacker will choose not to attack if , there are two cases to consider, depending on whether or not or more succinctly whether or not V 2P. The left hand panel of Figure 1 shows the profit of the three players when 2 and the right hand panel shows the profit of the three players when 2 . Notice that in both figures, for defender bids above P it does not matter is one is the high or low bidder (as the attacker will drop out). However, a defender's profit for a bid below P depends on ether or not the defender is the high or low bidder.
In the case where 2 , both defenders will invest just enough to keep the attacker from investing and thus and 0. Notice that the profit of the low bidding defender is maximized at P and if the low bidder bids P, the high bidding defender must bid at least P as well. In the case where 2 , the defenders are in an all-pay auction situation in which the loser's payoff is a function of the loser's bid. 
The first order condition of (5) simplifies to 1 1 1.
The maximum profit a defender can assure himself is the same as the profit the defender would expect to earn if there was a single target. In that case, the defender would choose to defend at the level , which is the bid that maximizes (3) as can be visualized in the right panel of Figure 1 . This level of investment identifies the security profit for a defender, (found by plugging into equation 3) and identifies the lower bound, , for the symmetric Nash equilibrium mixing distribution. Since each strategy generates the same expected profit in equilibrium, it must be that 1
Solving (6) for yields .
It is straightforward to show that (7) is increasing in . 6 The upper bound on the mixing distribution, , is such that 1. Plugging this into (7) and solving gives .
This bid yields a defender who is guaranteed not to be attacked the same profit that the defender who is guaranteed to be attacked can obtain, see right hand panel of Figure 1 . As > 0 over the interval [ , ] , equation 7 implicitly defines the symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Case 2: An Alliance
In the alliance, the attacker attacks the combined defense of the alliance members and if successful then randomly selects one of the targets to claim. 7 At the second stage, the 6 Figure 2 shows for the case in which V = P = 256 as in the laboratory experiments discussed in section 3. 7 An alternative cooperative arrangement is for the defenders to communicate and coordinate their activity, essentially merging into a single decision making entity and thus internalizing the externalities associated with investing (see discussion in footnote 2 about group decision making). There are two possible implementations of this arrangement mirroring the independent and alliance set-ups. The parallel to the independent defense is such that the defender will choose to invest the same amount at each target because attacker maximizes . The first order conditions yields an optimal attack allocation given by * 0
At the first stage, defender i maximizes his expected payoff, which is given by 1 which, after taking (8) into account simplifies to
The first order condition of (9) profit to the defender would be . Clearly, of these two choices a single decision maker would prefer to jointly protect the two targets.
Taking the results from the two cases above, it can be shown that defenders prefer to form an alliance rather than engage in independent defenses. There are three cases to consider.
If V > 4P defenses will be set such that the attacker drops out regardless of the whether or not the defenders form an alliance. Because independent defenders would invest P and (in the symmetric equilibrium) alliance members would invest in this case defenders clearly prefer the alliance. If ∈ 2 , 4 then the attacker would attack an alliance but not independently defended targets. In this range, the appropriate comparison is the profit of V -P from separate defenses and 1 from an alliance. It can be shown that 1 V -P and thus the defenders would prefer to form an alliance for values of V in this range. Finally, for ∈ 0,2 an alliance generates greater expected profit to each defender if 1 > . This condition holds if which is always true when separate defenders do not find it optimal to force the attacker to give up (i.e. when V < 2P).
Experiment Design
To empirically test the theoretical predictions of the model, we conducted controlled laboratory experiments. To avoid influencing behavior, the experiments involved neutral language. No mention was made of attacking, defending, alliances, winning, etc. Instead, the task was framed as subjects bidding to claim two colored items. Defenders were identified as either Yellow or Blue and valued the item of the corresponding color at 256
(and valued the other item at 0). Attackers were identified as Green and valued both the yellow and the green item at 256.
Three experimental treatments were implemented: Independent, Alliance, and Endogenous.
In the Independent treatment, Yellow and Blue (defenders) moved first and independently submitted bids for their respective items. 8 Once the bids were submitted, Green (the attacker) observed the bids, chose an item on which to bid, and then placed a bid for the selected item. The item upon which Green did not bid was awarded to the defender who valued it. The allocation of the item upon which Green did bid was resolved via a proportional contest success function as described in Section 2, Case1 with the winner receiving his value for the item. The results were revealed to all three participants and each person's profits were reduced by the amount of his bid and increased by the value of any item he claimed.
In the Alliance treatment, Yellow and Blue simultaneously submitted bids, knowing those bids would be combined into a single bid against Green. Green observed the bid by Yellow and Blue and then submitted her own bid. The outcome was determined using a proportional contest success function as described in Section 2, Case 2 above. If Green won the contest, Green was randomly assigned one of the items and the other was awarded to the defender who valued it. If Yellow and Blue won the contest, then both claimed their respective items. Regardless of the outcome, each participant had her bid deducted from her earnings and had the value of any claimed item added to her earnings.
The Endogenous treatment first presented Yellow and Blue with a binary choice to bid separately or to combine their bids. If both defenders opted to combine their bids then the experiment proceeded as in the Alliance treatment. Otherwise, the experiment proceeded as in the Independent treatment. Green knew that Yellow and Blue faced this choice and learned of the outcome before placing her bid. Because defender profits are higher under an Alliance, it is expected that defenders will opt in to the alliance when given the chance in the endogenous treatment and thus the expected outcomes are the same for the two treatments. 9 Table 1 gives expected bids and profits by treatment and Figure 2 shows the cumulative density function for the symmetric Nash Equilibrium distribution for separate defenses. A The bids and corresponding profits for the mixing distribution in the Independent treatment were simulated with ten million pairs of random draws in MATLAB. B The attacker's bid is a function of the lower of two draws from the mixing distribution used by the defenders.
In each experimental session, subjects participated in 30 contests, 10 in each treatment. In half of the sessions the treatment order was Independent, then Alliance and then
Endogenous. In the other half, the order of Independent and Alliance was reversed to control for ordering effects, but Endogenous was always implemented after subjects had familiarity with both defense methods so that their choice was informed.
The directions and the experiment were computerized using z-Tree ( When arriving at the lab, the twelve subjects in the session were seated at separate workstations isolated by privacy dividers. 10 Subjects were then randomly assigned a color role that was maintained throughout the entire experiment. 11 However, each period subjects were randomly and anonymously rematched with other participants. This procedure eliminates the ability of subjects to build a reputation or engage in other repeated play strategies that might cause behavior to differ from the one-shot model described in section 2.
The participants were undergraduate students at the University of Arkansas recruited from the Behavioral Business Research Laboratory's subject pool. While some of the subjects had participated in other studies, none had participated in any related experiments. 10 In one session only 9 subjects were present. 11 All defenders viewed themselves as being Yellow and viewed the other defender as being Blue. This increases the number of different pairings that could occur.
Subjects were paid in cash at the end of the approximately one hour experiment based upon their cumulative earnings. All of the values and bids in the experiment were denoted in Lab Dollars which were converted to $US at the rate 250 Lab Dollars = 1 $US. Because it is possible for subjects to lose money and in fact one of the three participants must lose money if they each place a positive bid, defenders were given an endowment of 750 while attackers were given an endowment of 1250. 12 The salient earnings averaged $18.98.
Subjects also received an additional $5 for participating.
Results
The Table 2 . Specifically, a linear random effects model is estimated where the dependent variable is the investment by a defender. The explanatory variables are a constant, AllianceDefense, and AllianceFirst. AllianceDefense, is a dummy variable that take a value of 1 if the observation was from a period in which the defender was in an alliance and a value of 0 otherwise. AllianceFirst is a dummy variable that take a value of 1 if the observation was from a session in which the defender experienced the Alliance treatment in periods 1 -10 and a value of 0 otherwise. To handle the repeated measures in the data, the estimation allows for a random effect for each defender and clusters standard errors at the session level. The treatment effect is captured by the negative and significant value of AllianceDefense in Table 2. Table 2 also reports a similar regression estimation for data from the Endogenous treatment (the last 10 periods) in which defenders have the option to form an alliance or not. Again, the predicted treatment effect is observed. Two additional features of Figure 2 and Table 2 are important. First, the distribution of investments in the Alliance treatment differs from the theoretically predicted (degenerate distribution at) 8. Instead, defenders invest an average of 62.6 in this treatment. 13 This overinvestment in defense is consistent both with previous contest experiments and research on public goods. By contrast, in the Independent treatment, subjects are observed 13 The average behavior reported throughout the results comes directly from the raw data. But it can be calculated from the estimation in the tables up to rounding error. For instance, 62.6 is approximately 86.23 -32.87+17.69/2. The AllianceFirst coefficient is halved because AllianceFirst = 1 for half of the observations and 0 for the other half.
to underinvest. The observed average investment in this treatment was 95.5 while the predicted level was 159.8 (See Table 1 ). 14 These observations provide the basis of Findings 2 and 3.
Finding 2: When in an alliance, defenders overinvest.

Finding 3: When defending separately, defenders underinvest.
The finding that investments are too high when defenders are in an alliance is supported statistically by testing  +   = 8 in Table 2 , which can be rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis that  +   > 8 (p-value < 0.001). Finding 3 is supported statistically by testing  = 159.8, which can be rejected in favor of the alternative that  < 159.8 (p-value <0.001).
We now turn to the behavior of attackers. Attacker behavior is predicated on the actions of the defenders. When defense is done individually, attackers are expected to attack the weaker defender. Indeed, this is the pattern that is observed as attackers opt to compete with weaker defender in 95.2% of the contests in Independent and 95.7% of the relevant contests in Endogenous. This is the evidence supporting Finding 4.
Finding 4: When facing two independently defended targets, attackers overwhelmingly attack the weaker one, consistent with the theoretical predictions.
The optimal response for attackers facing independent defenses is given by equation (2).
The observed responses of attackers in the Independent treatment are given in the left panel of Figure 3 . The size of the markers in this figure denotes the relative frequency of the observation. As evidenced by the left panel of Figure 3 , attackers overinvest conditional on the level of defense. Further, they tend to invest more in absolute terms than the defender and equation (2) For Alliance, the optimal attacker response is based on the total defense investment as shown in equation (8). The right panel of Figure 3 shows the observed attacks for this treatment. As in Independent, attackers in Alliance tend to overinvest. However, in comparison to Independent, here attackers are more likely to have less than a 50% chance of a successful attack as they frequently bid less than the total level of defense. Of course, part of the explanation for the apparent difference in attacker behavior between the two treatments is the fact that the level of defense faced by the attacker was more likely to be large (above say 150) under Alliance. And it is in this region where attackers are likely to given themselves less than a 50% chance of success. Also evident from the right panel of Figure 3 is that attackers do not give up when they should (i.e. when facing a defense that exceeds 256). This result is similar to that of Deck and Sheremeta (2012) . The patterns in For econometric support of Finding 5 we offer Table 3 , which is similar to the regression results presented above except that the dependent variable is the difference between the observed bid of the attacker and the optimal bid that the attacker should have made given the level of defense. Again, each individual was modeled with a random effect and standard errors were clustered at the session level. Overinvestment is captured in the constant term, which is positive significant regardless of whether or not one considers the first 20 periods or the Endogenous treatment. The lack of significance for AllianceDefense indicates that the level of overbidding does not differ by treatment. Given that attackers tend to overinvest and that the difference in defense investments while significant is not as dramatic as predicted, it is interesting to ask if the main policy implications of the model hold. Specifically are alliances more profitable for and thus preferred by defenders?
The average defender profit in Independent was 87.08 while the average defender profit in Alliance was 136.08. This difference is significant, as supported by the regression results reported in the first two columns of Table 4 . This estimation is similar to that reported above expect that the dependent variable is defender profit. Table 5 . These results are the basis of our final finding. Observations 460 230 Notes: standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Conclusion
Alliances are a common feature in many settings that can be modeled as contests. Alliances enable defenders to pool resources and offer a stronger defense than would otherwise be possible. However, the public good nature of the defense provided by the alliance creates incentives to free ride. Normally, the reduction in support for a public good is viewed as being suboptimal. However, in our setting the under contribution to the alliance's defense is pareto improving relative to separate defenses.
When defenders independently protect their own targets, the attacker's desire to focus on the weaker defender leads to an all pay auction arms race for the defenders. This leads defenders to invest heavily in their own defense. Unlike most of the all pay auctions that have been studied previously, in this all pay auction, the winner's payoff net of the bid is fixed, but the loser's net payoff is a non-linear function of the losing bid. An alliance can eliminate the arms race thereby greatly reducing the average defense investment. Despite the fact that the attacker is theoretically more likely to be successful when facing an alliance, this loss is offset (in expectation) by the reduced investment.
A series of controlled laboratory experiments largely confirms the qualitative predictions of the model: when facing two separately defended targets, attackers go after the weaker one; and defenders invest less and earn more in an alliance. Consistent with simultaneous contest experiments, in these sequential contest second mover attackers are observed to overinvest and fail to give up when it is optimal to do so. Overinvestment relative to the theoretical prediction is also observed for defenders in alliances, a result consistent not only with previous contest experiments but also previous experiments on the provision of public goods. In contrast, separate defenders underinvest relative to the theoretical prediction. However, this apparent behavioral anomaly may really have more to do with the model than behavior. 15 In particular, here defenders are expected to invest over half of the prize's value, whereas in most contests and all pay-auctions bidders are not expected to bid such a large portion of the prize value.
The general consistency we find between the theoretical and behavioral treatment effects of changing from independent defenses to alliances is encouraging. It suggests that this framework is reasonable for exploring more complicated and realistic scenarios such as multiple attackers who coordinate their actions or defenders who can invest in defending both the alliance and their own target. At the same time, the behavioral finding that separate defenders underinvest relative to the theoretical prediction warrants further exploration since this runs contrary to most previous laboratory experiments. If bidders prefer to invest a stable percentage of the prize value (including any psychological benefit from winning; see e.g. Price and Sheremeta 2012) rather than simply tending to overbid, this would have implications for contest design and implementation in a wide variety of settings.
Introduction
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. In addition to the $5 dollars you will receive for participating today, you have the opportunity to earn additional money. No person in the experiment (besides you) will know the decisions you make, and you will not be told the decisions of any other specific individual.
The experiment consists of three parts. At the end of the experiment you will be paid privately in cash for your total earnings in the entire experiment. However, the decisions you make in one part of the experiment will not impact any other part of the experiment. All amounts of money in the experiment are in Lab Dollars. At the end of the experiment, your Lab Dollars will be converted into $US at the rate 250 Lab Dollars = 1 $US. You will begin the experiment with 1250 (750) Lab Dollars. Any losses you incur during the experiment will be deducted from your Lab Dollars.
We will now walk through the instructions for part 1. Because the amount of money you will receive will depend upon the decisions you make, it is important that you understand the instructions completely. If you have a question at any point, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to answer it. Otherwise, you should not talk or communicate with anyone else during this experiment.
(Page 2)
Each part of the experiment involves a series of decision periods. Each period, you will be randomly shuffled into a group of 3 people. There will be 3 types of decision makers in each group: Yellow, Blue and Green. You have been randomly assigned the role of Green (Yellow) and will remain in that role for the entire experiment.
Each period there are two items available to be claimed: a yellow item and a blue item, shown as colored boxes on your screen. There is only one item of each color and a decision maker can claim at most one item in a period. Yellow decision makers value the yellow item at $256 but have no value for the blue item. Blue decision makers value the blue item at $256 but have no value for the yellow item. Green decision makers are indifferent between the two items and value each at $256.
If you claim an item, your earnings will increase by your value for the item. Since there are three decision makers and only two colored items, this means someone will not get an item.
What changes in each part of the experiment is how you claim items.
(Page 3 or 7: Independent Treatment) How do I claim an item in this part of the experiment?
In this part of the experiment, you can try to claim a blue or yellow (yellow) by bidding on it. The other decision makers can also try to claim items by bidding on them.
If only one decision maker bids on an item, that decision maker will claim the item. If two decision makers bid on the same item, then who claims the item will depend in part on how much each decision maker bid and in part on chance. The larger your bid, the more likely it is that you will claim an item. However, each bidder must pay whatever amount he or she bid regardless of whether or not he or she actually claims an item or was the only one bidding for it.
(Page 4 or 8: Independent Treatment) So how does bidding work?
The bidding process for this part of the experiment is as follows. First, Yellow and Blue will privately choose an amount to bid for the item of their respective color. Because Yellow and Blue only value the item in their own color, these decision makers can only bid on that item. They will place bids by typing their bid amounts in their separate boxes on their respective screens and pressing the Bid button. These bids must be a number from 0 to 256, because no one should be willing to bid more than their value for the item.
After Yellow and Blue bid, Green will then observe how much Yellow and Blue actually bid for the two items. Green will then choose one (and only one) of the two items on which to bid. Buttons will appear beside the two items on Green's screen. Green will select which item to bid on by clicking the button beside the item he or she wishes to bid on. After selecting which item to bid on, Green will then choose a bid from 0 to 256 by entering this amount in his or her box and pressing the bid button.
Because Green can only bid for one of the two items, this means either Blue or Yellow will be the only one bidding on the item Green does not bid on. The item that Green does not bid on automatically goes to the one decision maker who did bid on it (keep in mind that this decision maker still has to pay the amount of his or her bid). This will be denoted on your screen with a black arrow from the item to the decision maker that claimed it. Who claims the item is determined as follows. The chance that the bidder will claim the item is equal to own bid/ own bid other s bid . This means that the chance that the bidder will not claim the prize is equal to other s bid/ own bid other s bid . With this proportional formula, the more a decision maker bids the more likely that person is to claim an item.
Continuing the example rom before, suppose Yellow bids 30, Blue bids 60, and Green bids 30.
If Green chooses to bid for the yellow item then the chance that Green claims the item is 30/(30+30) = 0.5 or 50% and the chance that Yellow claims the item is 30/(30+30) = 0.5 or 50%. After everyone has bid, a bar will appear on the left side of your screen to show you the chance that each decision maker will not claim the item he or she bid on. The total height of the bar represents 100% and each color segment denotes the chance that decision maker will be the one who does not claim an item. Notice that either Yellow or Blue will not appear in this bar because one of them is guaranteed to claim the item Green does not bid on. The computer will randomly place an X somewhere on the bar to determine who does not get to claim an item. A black arrow on your screen will indicate who claims the second item.
We are now ready to begin this part of the experiment. Keep in mind that this part of the experiment will last several periods and that you will be randomly shuffled into a group of 3 people each period. If you have any questions you'd like to ask before the experiment starts, please ask them now. Otherwise, press the button below that says BEGIN.
(Page 3 or 7: Alliance Treatment) How do I claim an item in this part of the experiment?
In this part of the experiment, you can try to claim a by bidding on it. The other decision makers can also try to claim items by bidding on them, but the bids of the Yellow and Blue decision makers will be combined.
Who claims the item will depend in part on how much each decision maker bid and in part on chance. The larger your bid, the more likely it is that you will claim an item. However, each bidder must pay whatever amount he or she bid regardless of whether or not he or she actually claims an item. The bidding process for this part of the experiment is as follow. First, Yellow and Blue will privately choose an amount to bid for the item of their respective color. They will place bids by typing their bid amounts in their joint box on their respective screens and pressing the Bid button. These bids must be a number from 0 to 256, because no one should be willing to bid more than their value for the item. The amount that Blue and Yellow bid will be added together to become the Combined Bid.
After Yellow and Blue bid, Green will then observe the Combined Bid. Green will then choose a bid from 0 to 256 by entering this amount in his or her box and pressing the bid button.
The chance that Green claims an item is .
If Green claims an item, then Green will be randomly assigned to claim either the yellow item or the blue item because Green values them equally. Notice that Green can claim only one item leaving the other item to be automatically claimed by the other decision maker who values it. So if Green claims the blue item then Yellow would claim the yellow item.
If Green does not claim an item, then Yellow and Blue both claim the item they value. The chance that
Green does not get to claim an item is .
With this proportional formula, the more a decision maker bids the more likely that person is to claim an item.
(Page 5 or 9: Alliance Treatment)
Notice that there are two ways that Blue or Yellow can claim an item. One way is if Green does not get to claim an item and the other is if Green gets to claim an item, but claims the item that is not valued.
This means that there is only one way that Blue does not get to claim an item, which is Green gets to claim an item and it happens to be the blue one. Therefore, the chance that Blue does not get to claim an item is . Similarly, Yellow has the same chance of not getting to claim an item as Blue has.
Let's look at an example: Suppose Yellow bids 30, Blue bids 60, and Green bids 30.
The Combined Bid would be Yellow's bid plus Blue's bid, which is 30 60 90. Therefore, the chance that Green does not get to claim an item (and thus that Yellow and Blue both get to claim an item) is = 0.75 or 75%.
The chance that Green does get to claim an item is = 0.25 or 25%. This means that the chance that Blue does not get to claim an item is 25% = 12.5% and the chance that Yellow does not get to claim an item is also 12.5%. After everyone has bid, a bar will appear on the left side of your screen to show you the chance that each decision maker will not claim the item he or she values. The total height of the bar represents 100% and each color segment denotes the chance that decision maker will be the one who does not claim an item. The computer will randomly place an X somewhere on the bar to determine who does not get to claim an item. Black arrows on your screen will indicate who claims each of the items.
(Page 11: Endogenous Treatment)
How do I claim an item in this part of the experiment?
How items are claimed depends on Yellow and Blue. In the first two parts of the experiment bids by Yellow and Blue were required to be separate or required to be combined. In this part of the experiment, Blue and Yellow can choose to bid separately or have their bids combined.
Buttons will appear on the screens of Blue and Yellow decision makers asking which process they would like to use for claiming regions that period. If both Yellow and Blue opt to have their bids combined, then that process will be implemented. If either or both Yellow and Blue opt to bid separately, then that process will be implemented.
Once the bidding process is determined, the period will progress accordingly following the same sequence as in the corresponding previous part of the experiment.
